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Abstract
Specifying a security policy that includes both permissions and prohibitions, may lead to conﬂicts. This
corresponds to a situation where a subject is both permitted and prohibited to perform a given action on
a given object. We adopt a comparative approach to investigate this problem. We ﬁrst investigate access
control models based on rules, called Rule-BAC, and present weaknesses that arise when we try to manage
conﬂicts in this model. In particular, Rule-BAC models fail to provide decidable solution to redundant rules
and potential conﬂicts problems. Then, we show how a more structured model, say OR-BAC (Organization
Based Access Control), gifted with inheritance mechanism make redundant rules and potential conﬂict
problems tractable in polynomial time.
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1 Introduction
Access control is modelled as a set of authorizations speciﬁed either by a security
oﬃcer or a private user in accordance with some security policy. Usually, these
authorizations specify that a given subject (a user or a process) is permitted to per-
form a given action (an access mode) on a given object (a resource of the system).
This static authorization triple 〈subject, action, object〉 is suited for traditional en-
vironments and applications but is less appropriate to meet requirements of the
rising systems. Indeed, there is a need of more expressiveness, that is other kinds
of authorizations must be supported: content based authorization, constraint based
authorization and more particularly negative authorization. In that way the security
oﬃcer is given means to specify general contextual permission rules and associate
exceptions to these general rules using prohibitions. For instance, a nurse may be
permitted to consult a medical record (general rule) except the physician’s private
comments (exception corresponding to prohibition). Moreover, in an access control
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model where hierarchies and inheritance mechanisms are included, prohibitions can
be used to regulate the inheritance policy of permissions.
However, when an access control model includes the possibility to specify both
permissions and prohibitions, some conﬂicts may occur. This is the case when a
subject is both permitted and prohibited to perform an action on an object. Hence,
the system might not be able to decide either to allow or deny the access. This
problem was investigated by several models (for instance [2,9,7,3,16,5,15,1]). The
conﬂict issue must be addressed by deﬁning a conﬂict resolution strategy. A conﬂict
resolution strategy consists in a set of rules that enable the system to decide, in case
of a conﬂict, to discard either the positive or the negative authorization. Therefore,
the resulting access control policy will depend on the chosen conﬂict resolution
policy. Thus the security oﬃcer should have the possibility to deﬁne his or her own
conﬂict resolution strategy in order to obtain a relevant access control policy.
Rule based access control (Rule-BAC) termed models [7,3,15,4,13] take the lead
of access control models attempting to meet expressiveness requirements and oﬀer
means to solve conﬂict problems. In this kind of model, access control is deﬁned as
a set of rules Condition → Authorization where Condition is a set of constraints
over the subjects, actions and objects. In this paper, we begin with analyzing con-
ﬂict management in the context of Rule-BAC Model and show that there are several
problems this model fails to solve. First, assigning higher priorities to some access
rules to manage conﬂicts can lead to the emergence of rules that never apply, say
redundant rules. Unfortunately, checking the non-redundancy condition is undecid-
able and there is a lack of replacement solution in the Rule-BAC model. The second
unsolved problem is that current solutions only manage actual conﬂicts but they
are unable to detect potential conﬂicts, that is the coexistence of rules that lead to
some conﬂicts if their associated conditions are simultaneously satisﬁed. Managing
potential conﬂicts is important since we gain the guarantee that actual conﬂict will
never occur. However, checking the potential conﬂict condition in the Rule-BAC
model is also undecidable. We argue that the main reason of these drawbacks is a
structure lack of Rule-BAC models.
We then analyze these problems in the context of the Or-BAC model [17] and
show how all of them are formally and eﬀectively solved. In Or-BAC, which is a
structured and more expressive model built on top of Rule-BAC, specifying an access
control policy is centered around the concept of organization. Each organization can
specify its own security policy at an “organizational” level. For this purpose, a policy
speciﬁes that some roles are permitted or prohibited to perform some activities on
some views. These concepts of role, activity and view are used to specify the policy
independently from concrete implementation of subjects, actions and objects in the
system. Moreover, Or-BAC model gives means to specify contextual authorizations.
The approach used to manage conﬂicts in Or-BAC is based on assigning priorities
to access control rules as we suggest in Rule-BAC. Nevertheless, to overcome diﬃ-
culties encountered in Rule-BAC, we restate the problems of rule redundancy and
potential conﬂicts using inheritance mechanisms and separated constraints speciﬁ-
cation [14]. We then show that, using this approach, rule redundancy and potential
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conﬂicts are tractable problems computable in polynomial time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The basic Rule-BAC model
and associated conﬂict management are introduced in section 2. Then, in Section
3, we deﬁne the prioritized Rule-BAC model and show how more expressive conﬂict
resolution strategies may be deﬁned in this model. In this section, we also bring out
redundancy and potential conﬂict problems that this model fails to solve. Section
4 is dedicated to the Or-BAC model. We introduce in this section the model and
its conﬂict management principles. We emphasize on the hierarchy structure of this
model. Then we show in section 4.3 and section 4.4 how the Or-BAC components
and its hierarchy structure are used in the authorization derivation mechanism and
separated constraint speciﬁcation to succeed in solving the undecidability problems
of redundant rules and potential conﬂict detection. Section 5 is a discussion about
related works and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Rule Based Access Control
2.1 Rule-BAC principles
In Rule-BAC models, a policy is seen as a set of access control rules in which some
conditions drive a positive or negative authorizations:
condition → Permission(Subject,Action,Object) or,
condition → Prohibition(Subject,Action,Object)
In the Rule-BAC model, a conﬂict occurs when it is possible to apply two dif-
ferent access control rules to derive that a given subject is both permitted and
prohibited to perform a same action on a same object:
∃s,∃a,∃o, Permission(s, a, o) ∧ Prohibition(s, a, o)
When implementing a given policy, conﬂicts must be solved, else it should not be
possible to decide if a given access must be granted or denied when a conﬂict occurs.
The approach to solve conﬂicts consists in deﬁning a conﬂict resolution strategy
(CRS). The basic principle of a CRS is to consider that predicates Permission
and Prohibition only deﬁne prima facie authorizations. The objective of a CRS is
to derive actual authorizations from prima facie authorizations. For this purpose,
we shall consider predicates A-Permission and A-Prohibition to represent actual
positive or negative authorizations. Thus, a CRS will be deﬁned as a set of rules
having the predicates A-Permission or A-Prohibition in the conclusion.
Let us now present a formalization of Rule-BAC principles.
2.2 Rule-BAC model
This section is dedicated to the formal deﬁnition of the Rule-BAC model. In the
Rule-BAC model, a policy is speciﬁed in ﬁrst order logic language. This language
should include the following predicates.
Deﬁnition 1: We introduce four kinds of predicates.
• Domain predicates. Predicates used to model the IT system to which the policy
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applies. Thus, domain predicates depend on the application ﬁeld.
• Prima Facie access control predicates. Predicates used to express prima facie pos-
itive and negative authorizations: Permission(x, y, z) and Prohibition(x, y, z).
• Actual access control predicates. Predicates used to express actual positive and
negative authorizations: A-Permission(x, y, z) and A-Prohibition(x, y, z).
• Constraint violation predicate. Predicate used to express a constraint violation:
error().
Deﬁnition 2: The domain to which the policy applies is represented by a ﬁnite set
of domain formulae Dom, Dom = Rdom ∪ IDom, where:
• IDom (domain instance) is a ﬁnite set of facts P (t1, ..., tn) where P is a domain
predicate.
• RDom (domain rules) is a ﬁnite set of closed domain formulae, that is for-
mulae that only contain domain predicates. For example: ∀x, surgeon(x) →
physician(x)
Deﬁnition 3: The domain constraints Cte is a ﬁnite set of formulae having the
form condition → error() where condition represents a generic well-formed formula.
Deﬁnition 4: An access control policy ACP is a ﬁnite set of well-formed closed
formulae such as:
• ∀s,∀a,∀o,Condition → Permission(s, a, o) or
• ∀s,∀a,∀o,Condition → Prohibition(s, a, o)
where Condition is a conjunctive formula P 1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn and each Pi represents a
generic well-formed formula.
Deﬁnition 5: A conﬂict resolution strategy CRS is a ﬁnite set of rules having the
predicates A-Permission or A-Prohibition in the conclusion.
Deﬁnition 6: A regulated system Sys is a logical theory deﬁned as follows:
• Sys = ACP ∪CRS ∪Dom ∪Cte
Assumption 1: In the following, we suppose that there is no violated constraint,
that is, the constraint predicate error() can never be derived from the regulated
system Sys: Sys 	
 error().
The main drawback of full ﬁrst order logic is that it leads to undecidable theory.
Thus, we have to restrict the regulated system deﬁnition to obtain a decidable
and tractable theory. One way to proceed is to consider that a regulated system
corresponds to a stratiﬁed Datalog program [18]. Stratifying a Datalog program
consists in ordering rules so that if a rule contains a negative literal then the rule that
deﬁnes this literal is computed ﬁrst. A stratiﬁed Datalog program is computable in
polynomial time.
In the following, we assume that a Rule-BAC policy corresponds to a stratiﬁed
Datalog program and similarly for the Prioritized Rule-BAC and Or-BAC models
presented in sections 3 and 4.
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2.3 Conﬂict management
In a Rule-BAC policy, a prima facie conﬂict appears when prima facie permission
and prohibition are assigned to the same subject, action and object.
Deﬁnition 7: The access control policy ACP of a regulated system Sys
is a prima facie conﬂicting policy iﬀ: Sys 
 ∃s,∃a,∃o, Permission(s, a, o) ∧
Prohibition(s, a, o).
As we have given the deﬁnition of a conﬂict resolution strategy, we can now give
a deﬁnition of an actual conﬂict.
Deﬁnition 8: The access control policy ACP of a regulated system Sys managed
by a conﬂict resolution strategy CRS is an actual conﬂicting policy iﬀ:
• Sys 
 ∃s,∃a,∃o,A-Permission(s, a, o) ∧A-Prohibition(s, a, o)
Theorem 1: If Sys is a regulated system that corresponds to a Datalog program,
then we can decide that Sys is an actual conﬂicting policy in polynomial time.
Proof: The proof is trivial. Regulated systems correspond to stratiﬁed Datalog
programs, which are computable in polynomial time. 
The main idea is that a conﬂict resolution strategy does not necessarily guarantee
that all conﬂicts will be solved. Thus, there might remain some conﬂicts between
some actual authorizations. If it can be proved that a strategy solves all conﬂicts
then it is called an eﬀective strategy.
Deﬁnition 9: A conﬂict resolution strategy is eﬀective if it guarantees that any
regulated system to which it is applied does not contain any actual conﬂict.
Theorem 2: If CRS is a conﬂict resolution strategy, then checking that CRS is
an eﬀective strategy is generally undecidable.
Proof: Let CRS be some conﬂict resolution strategy. Then to prove that this
strategy is eﬀective, we have to prove that, for every system SysCRS regulated by
CRS:
SysCRS 
 ¬(∃s,∃a,∃o,A-Permission(s, a, o) ∧A-Prohibition(s, a, o))
However, we know that proving that a given formula is a theorem of ﬁrst order
logic is generally undecidable. 
2.4 Example
We consider a example of simple conﬂict management strategy S1:
• S1 : Prohibitions take precedence
Prohibition(s, a, o) → A-Prohibition(s, a, o)
Permission(s, a, o) ∧ ¬Prohibition(s, a, o) → A-Permission(s, a, o)
If S1 is applied to a stratiﬁed policy, this policy remains stratiﬁed. Actually in
S1, Prohibition is in a lower stratum than Permission.
Let us now consider an example of regulated system:
R1: nurse(x) ∧medical record(y) → Prohibition(x, read, y)
“A nurse is prohibited to read any medical record”
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R2: nurse(x) ∧medical record(y) ∧ patient record(y, z) ∧ urgent case(z)
→ Permission(x, read, y)
“In case of emergency, a nurse is permitted to read the patient’s medical record”
R3: physician(x) ∧medical record(y) ∧
patient record(y, z) ∧ attending physician(z, x)
→ Permission(x, read, y)
“A physician is permitted to read the medical records of her own patients”
R4: physician(x) ∧medical record(y) ∧ suspended(x)
→ Prohibition(x, read, y)
“A physician is prohibited to read any medical record as long as she is suspended”
IDOM: physician(John) ∧ suspended(John) ∧
nurse(Peter) ∧medical record(doc 31) ∧ patient record(doc 31,Mary) ∧
attending physician(Mary, John) ∧ urgent case(Mary)
The following prima facie authorizations are derived from this policy:
• Prohibition(Peter, read, doc 31) (from R1)
• Permission(Peter, read, doc 31) (from R2)
• Permission(John, read, doc 31) (from R3)
• Prohibition(John, read, doc 31) (from R4)
The ﬁrst authorization is conﬂicting with the second one and it is also the case
for the third and the fourth authorizations. Let us apply strategy S1 to this policy.
We obtain the following actual authorizations:
• A-Prohibition(Peter, read, doc 31)
• A-Prohibition(John, read, doc 31)
Using strategy S1, we notice that rule R1 always takes precedence over rule R2.
Thus, R2 is useless as it is never applied. This shows that strategy S1 is too coarse.
In the following section, we consider conﬂict management strategies that provide
means to deﬁne priorities over the authorizations in a much more elaborate way.
3 Prioritized Rule-BAC
3.1 Principle
We associate the authorization rules with priorities in order to evaluate their sig-
niﬁcance in conﬂicting situations. Priorities between access control rules may be
sometimes derived from the rules syntactical format. For instance, let us come back
to rules R1 and R2 of our previous example. If we consider that rule R1 has higher
priority than rule R2, then R2 will never apply and is therefore useless. In this
case, we shall say that rule R2 is a redundant rule. To avoid this misspeciﬁcation,
we can conclude that rule R2 must be associated with higher priority than rule R1.
In the following section, we shall formally deﬁne this notion of redundant rule.
However, automatic management of priorities based on rule syntactical format
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is not always possible and it is sometimes necessary to explicitly assign priorities to
rules to solve conﬂicts. For instance, consider the following access control rule:
R5: nurse(x) ∧medical record(y) ∧ suspended(x) → Prohibition(x, read, y)
“A suspended nurse is prohibited to consult any medical record”
Let us now assume that Peter is a suspended nurse and that Mary is an urgent
case. Which rule applies to this situation? Is it rule R2? In this case, we shall
conclude that Peter is permitted to read Mary’s medical record. Or rule R5 so that
we shall conclude that Peter is prohibited to read Mary’s medical record? In this
example, we cannot use the rule syntactical format to decide which rule applies.
Explicit priorities must be assigned to rules R2 and R5 to solve the conﬂict.
Notice also that if there is no suspended nurse or no urgent patient case, then it
is no longer possible to apply both rules R2 and R5. So, in this situation, there is
no actual conﬂict. However, in this situation, we shall say that there is a potential
conﬂict between rules R2 and R5, that is a conﬂict will occur when a suspended
nurse and an urgent patient case are both inserted in the domain instance IDom.
In the following, we shall formally deﬁne this notion of potential conﬂict.
3.2 Prioritized Rule-BAC model
We consider Π a ﬁnite set of priorities. We assume that Π is associated with a
partial order relation ≺. If p1 and p2 are two priorities, then p1 ≺ p2 means that p2
has higher priority than p1.
The Prioritized Rule-BAC model is then deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 10: This deﬁnition is similar to deﬁnition 1 except that we replace:
3-place predicate Permission(subject, action, object) by
4-place predicate Permission(subject, action, object, priority), and
3-place predicate Prohibition(subject, action, object) by
4-place predicate Prohibition(subject, action, object, priority).
We also introduce two new predicates Higher-Permission and Higher-
Prohibition. Higher-Permission(s, a, o, p) means that there exists a permission
for subject s, action a and object o having a priority higher than p. Higher-
Prohibition(s, a, o, p) means that there exists prohibition over s, a and o having a
priority higher than p.
Deﬁnition 2 and 3 remains unchanged except that RDom and Cte include the
following rules:
• Permission(s, a, o, p2) ∧ p2 ≺ p1 → Higher-Permission(s, a, o, p1)
• Prohibition(s, a, o, p2) ∧ p2 ≺ p1 → Higher-Prohibition(s, a, o, p1)
• (p1 ≺ p2 ∧ p2 ≺ p3) → p1 ≺ p3 (transitivity of ≺)
• (p1 ≺ p2 ∧ p2 ≺ p1) → error() (antisymmetry of ≺)
Deﬁnition 4, 5 and 6 are respectively replaced by deﬁnition 11, 12 and 13:
Deﬁnition 11: A prioritized access control policy PACP is a ﬁnite set of well-
formed closed formulae deﬁned as follows:
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• ∀s,∀a,∀o,∀p,Condition → Permission(s, a, o, p) or
• ∀s,∀a,∀o,∀p,Condition → Prohibition(s, a, o, p)
Deﬁnition 12: A global conﬂict resolution strategy GCRS corresponds to the
following two rules:
• Permission(s, a, o, p) ∧ ¬Higher-Prohibition(s, a, o, p)
→ A-Permission(s, a, o)
• Prohibition(s, a, o, p) ∧ ¬Higher-Permission(s, a, o, p)
→ A-Prohibition(s, a, o)
The ﬁrst rule states that an actual permission can be derived from a prima facie
permission if there is no higher prima facie prohibition in the access control policy.
The second rule is similar but for deriving actual prohibitions.
Deﬁnition 13: A regulated system Sys is a logical theory deﬁned as follows:
• Sys = PACP ∪GCRS ∪Dom ∪ Cte
3.3 Conﬂict management
In Prioritized Rule-BAC, deﬁnition of a prima facie conﬂict is similar to deﬁnition
7 except that we have to insert priorities. This leads to deﬁnition 14.
Deﬁnition 14: The prioritized access control policy PACP of a regulated system
Sys is a prima facie conﬂicting policy iﬀ:
Sys 
 ∃s,∃a,∃o,∃p1,∃p2, P ermission(s, a, o, p1) ∧ Prohibition(s, a, o, p2).
We also specify as a constraint, called CP (for Consistent Priority), that a prima
facie conﬂict cannot occur with the same priority level:
CP: Permission(s, a, o, p) ∧ Prohibition(s, a, o, p) → error()
If CP is violated, it is no longer possible to apply ordered priorities to solve the
conﬂict since the conﬂicting permission and prohibition have equal priorities.
Deﬁnition of actual conﬂict in Prioritized Rule-BAC is similar to deﬁnition 8.
We can then prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3: If the constraint CP is never violated and if the set Π of priority
levels is associated with a total order relation, then the global conﬂict resolution
strategy GCRS is eﬀective.
Proof: Let us assume that the global conﬂict resolution strategy GCRS is not
eﬀective. It follows from deﬁnition 9 that there is an actual conﬂict such that
∃s,∃a,∃o,A-Permission(s, a, o) ∧ A-Prohibition(s, a, o). The only way to derive
these facts is by applying the following rules (deﬁnition 12) :
Permission(s, a, o, p) ∧ ¬Higher-Prohibition(s, a, o, p)
→ A-Permission(s, a, o) (1)
Prohibition(s, a, o, p) ∧ ¬Higher-Permission(s, a, o, p)
→ A-Prohibition(s, a, o) (2)
Rule 1 means that there is a priority level p1 such that Permission(s, a, o, p1)
and there is no p′1 such that (p1 ≺ p
′
1 ∧ Prohibition(s, a, o, p
′
1)). Similarly rule 2
means that there is a priority level p2 such that Prohibition(s, a, o, p2) and there is
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no p′2 such that (p2 ≺ p
′
2 ∧ Permission(s, a, o, p
′
2)).
So, since the constraint CP cannot be violated, we cannot have p1 = p2. So, we
can conclude that we have (Permission(s, a, o, p1)∧Prohibition(s, a, o, p2)∧¬(p1 ≺
p2) ∧ ¬(p2 ≺ p1)). But, this is in contradiction with the assumption that the set Π
of priority levels is associated with a total order relation. 
Notice that this theorem does not apply if the set of priority levels is associated
with a partial order relation. Unfortunately, a partial order relation is more ﬂexible
than a total order because it is not necessary to compare the priority of every pair
of access control rules. For instance, let us consider rules R1 and R3. Rule R1
applies to nurses whereas rule R3 applies to physicians. Let us assume that there
is a constraint that speciﬁes that a subject cannot be both a nurse and a physician:
C1: ∀x, (nurse(x) ∧ physician(x)) → error()
In this case, it is never possible to apply both rules R1 and R3 to derive a
conﬂict. We shall say that R1 and R3 are unrelated. It is not necessary to compare
the priority of unrelated rules and therefore a partial order relation on priorities is
suﬃcient in this case. Unrelated rules are further formalized in section 3.5.
3.4 Redundant rules
Let us consider rules R1 and R2. We can consider that R1 speciﬁes a general
case (Nurses are prohibited to read medical records) whereas rule R2 speciﬁes an
exception to rule R1 (Nurses are actually permitted to read medical record in case
of emergency). Exceptions are formalized as follows. Let us consider two rules Ri
and Rj and let condition(Ri) and condition(Rj) be the conditions of Ri and Rj.
Deﬁnition 15: Rule Ri is an exception to rule Rj if we can prove that:
(RDom ∪Cte∗) 
 condition(Ri) → condition(Rj)
where Cte∗ is deﬁned as follows:
¬condition ∈ Cte∗ iﬀ (condition → error()) ∈ Cte
For instance, if we assume that the above constraint C1 belongs to Cte then
formula ¬(nurse(x) ∧ physician(x)) belongs to Cte∗.
Deﬁnition 16: Rule Ri is a strict exception to rule Rj if Ri is an exception to rule
Rj and Rj is not an exception to rule Ri.
Now, if rule Ri is a strict exception to rule Rj, then Ri should be assigned higher
priority than rule Rj, else Ri never applies and is therefore a redundant rule. We
can give the condition to prevent redundant rules. Let us consider two rules Ri and
Rj and let Priority(Ri) and Priority(Rj) be the priorities of Ri and Rj .
Non-redundancy condition: If rule Ri is a strict exception to rule Rj then
Priority(Rj) ≺ Priority(Ri).
Recognizing redundant rules is clearly an important problem. Unfortunately, we
can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4: Checking that rule Ri is an exception to rule Rj is generally unde-
cidable.
Proof: As for theorem 2, the proof of theorem 4 is based on the undecidability of
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ﬁrst order logic.
So, let condition(Ri) and condition(Rj) be respectively the conditions of rules
Ri and Rj. We have to show that proving:
(RDom ∪Cte∗) 
 condition(Ri) → condition(Rj)
is generally undecidable.
For this purpose, we show that (RDom ∪ Cte∗) actually corresponds to any
theory in ﬁrst order logic.
So let F be a ﬁrst order formula built using some domain predicates of the
regulated system.
If F respects the Datalog restriction, F will be included in RDom.
If F does not respect the Datalog restriction, we can write a constraint of
Cte having the form ¬F → error(). For instance, let us consider the formula
∀x,Nurse(x) → ¬Physician(x) (a nurse is not a physician). Due to the negation
in the conclusion, this is not a Datalog formula. However, we can include in Cte
the following constraint:
∀x, (Nurse(x) ∧ Physician(x)) → error()
However, when building Cte∗, the formula F will be inserted in the theory
(RDom ∪ Cte∗). So, (RDom ∪ Cte∗) can actually include any ﬁrst order formula,
and thus proof in this theory is generally undecidable.
As a consequence, checking the non-redundancy condition is also undecidable.

3.5 Potential conﬂict detection
Deﬁnition 8 provides means to derive actual conﬂicts. However, in Rule-BAC the
set of authorizations may change dynamically as the authorization conditions are
updated. In the example of section 2.4, if physician John is no longer suspended,
rule R3 does not apply to John anymore.
The administrator of an access control policy may want to establish the rule
pairs that may lead to conﬂict situations. In our example, rules R2 and R5 do not
generate a conﬂict as long as nurse Peter is not suspended. Such a situation is called
a potential conﬂict. To recognize potential conﬂict situations, we need to model the
notion of unrelated rules suggested in section 3.3.
Deﬁnition 17: Rules Ri and rule Rj are unrelated iﬀ we can prove that:
(RDom ∪Cte∗) 
 ¬(condition(Ri) ∧ condition(Rj))
We can now specify a condition for situations of potential conﬂict.
Potential conﬂict condition: (ﬁrst deﬁnition) There is a potential conﬂict
between two rules Ri and Rj if:
• Ri derives a permission and,
• Rj derives a prohibition and,
• Ri and Rj are not two unrelated rules and,
• Priority(Ri) and Priority(Rj) are not comparable.
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We can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5: Let us consider a given prioritized access control policy PACP of a
regulated system Sys. If there is an actual conﬂict in Sys, then there is a potential
conﬂict between two access control rules of PACP .
Proof: Let us assume that there is an actual conﬂict and there is no potential
conﬂict between two access control rules of PACP.
An actual conﬂict occurs when (deﬁnition 8):
∃s,∃a,∃o,A-Permission(s, a, o) ∧A-Prohibition(s, a, o)
It follows from deﬁnition 12 that an actual conﬂict occurs when:
Permission(s, a, o, p1) ∧ ¬Higher-Prohibition(s, a, o, p1) ∧
Prohibition(s, a, o, p2) ∧ ¬Higher-Permission(s, a, o, p2) (1)
We can thus conclude that there are two rules Ri and Rj such that Ri derives
Permission(s, a, o, p1) and Rj derives Prohibition(s, a, o, p2) and that Ri and Rj
are not unrelated rules. Now, assume that there is no potential conﬂict between
Ri and Rj. It follows from the ﬁrst deﬁnition of potential conﬂict condition the
following rule:
Permission(s, a, o, p1) ∧ Prohibition(s, a, o, p2) ∧
(Higher-Prohibition(s, a, o, p1) ∨Higher-Permission(s, a, o, p2)) (2)
We can conclude that the assumption there is no potential conﬂict given by rule
(2) is in contradiction with the assumption there is an actual conﬂict given by rule
(1). 
We can actually ﬁnd a weaker potential conﬂict condition than the one suggested
above. To illustrate the problem, let us consider the following access control rule:
R6: nurse(x) ∧medical record(y) ∧
patient record(y, z) ∧ urgent case(z) ∧ suspended(x)
→ Permission(x, read, y)
In this case, rule R6 acts as an exception to rule R5 and thus it must have higher
priority than rule R5 if the non redundant rule condition presented in section 3.4
is satisﬁed. Now, the potential conﬂict between rules R2 and R5 is solved: due to
rule R6, we can conclude that a nurse is permitted to read the medical record of an
urgent case patient, even if this nurse is suspended.
Therefore, we can relax the potential conﬂict condition as follows.
Potential conﬂict condition: (second deﬁnition) There is a potential conﬂict
between two rules Ri and Rj if:
• Ri derives a permission and,
• Rj derives a prohibition and,
• Ri and Rj are not two unrelated rules and,
• there is no rule Rk such that:
· (RDom ∪ Cte∗) 
 (condition(Ri) ∧ condition(Rj)) → condition(Rk)
· and ( (Rk derives a prohibition and Priority(Ri) ≺ Priority(Rk)) or
(Rk derives a permission and Priority(Rj) ≺ Priority(Rk)))
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We can still use this second condition to prove theorem 5.
Proof: First steps of the proof are similar to the ﬁrst deﬁnition. If we assume that
there is an actual conﬂict, then we can conclude that there are two rules Ri and Rj
such that Ri derives Permission(s, a, o, p1) and Rj derives Prohibition(s, a, o, p2)
and that Ri and Rj are not unrelated rules. Now, assume that there is no potential
conﬂict between Ri and Rj according to the second deﬁnition. This means that
there is a rule Rk such that (condition(Ri) ∧ condition(Rj)) → condition(Rk).
Thus we can apply rule Rk and derive (p3 represents priority(Rk)):
(Prohibition(s, a, o, p3) ∧Higher-Prohibition(s, a, o, p1)) ∨
(Permission(s, a, o, p3) ∧Higher-Permission(s, a, o, p2)) (3)
So, we can conclude that the assumption there is no potential conﬂict given by
rule (3) is in contradiction with the assumption there is an actual conﬂict. 
Unfortunately, we can also state the following theorem:
Theorem 6: Checking that two rules Ri and Rj are unrelated is generally unde-
cidable.
Proof: Proof is similar to theorem 4. 
As a consequence, checking the potential conﬂict conditions (ﬁrst or second
condition) is also undecidable.
3.6 Example
We consider the access control policy corresponding to rules R1 to R5 and we assume
that Π is {p1, p2, p3} with p1 ≺ p2 ≺ p3. The access control rules are associated
with the following priorities: (1) R1 and R3 have priority p1, (2) R2 and R4 have
priority p2 and (3) R5 has priority p3.
We also assume that constraint C1 is not violated so that a subject cannot be
both a nurse and a physician.
One can check that R2 is a strict exception to R1. Applying the non redundancy
condition, we can conclude that R2 must have higher priority than R1. This is
compatible with the assumption that p1 ≺ p2. Similarly, R5 is a strict exception to
R1 which is compatible with the assumption that p1 ≺ p3.
R3 and R4 are not unrelated rules. However, since R4 has higher priority than
rule R3, potential conﬂict is solved. A similar comment applies to rules R2 and R5.
Finally, due to constraint C1, rules R1 and R3 are unrelated. So, there is no
potential conﬂict between these two rules. Similarly, R2 and R4 are unrelated rules
and R3 and R5 are unrelated rules.
We can thus conclude that there is no redundant rule and no potential conﬂict
in this prioritized access control policy. Thus, using the contraposition of theorem
5, we can derive that there will be no actual conﬂict in every system regulated by
this access control policy.
Another way to derive the same result is by using theorem 3. Since Π is associ-
ated with a total order relation, we have simply to check that constraint CP cannot
be violated. The only way to violate CP is by applying both rules having the same
priorities, that is rules R1-R3 or rules R2-R4. Since rules R1-R3 and rules R2-R4
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are both unrelated, this is not possible. As a consequence, we can conclude that
this strategy is eﬀective and no actual conﬂict is possible.
3.7 Summary
Using the Prioritized Rule-BAC model, we have presented two diﬀerent ways to
prevent actual conﬂicts.
The ﬁrst approach is by showing that the strategy is eﬀective. However, this
approach is restricted to access control policies that are associated with a total order
relation. Moreover, we have to check that constraint CP is not violated.
The second approach is by checking the Potential Conﬂict Condition. This
approach may be used when a partial order relation is used. Unfortunately, checking
the Potential Conﬂict Condition is generally undecidable.
In both approaches, we also show how to detect redundant rules. This is impor-
tant since redundant rules often correspond to speciﬁcation errors. Indeed, it is not
“normal” that an administrator includes useless rules in the access control policy.
However, checking the Non-Redundancy Condition is also generally undecidable.
Furthermore, there is no simple way in Prioritized Rule-BAC to specify auto-
matic priority assignment strategies. For instance, it may be useful to specify that
access control rules related to emergency situations have higher priority than other
access control rules.
In the following section, we present the Or-BAC model and show how this model
provides solutions to these diﬀerent issues, namely we restate the potential con-
ﬂict and redundant rules problems so that that these problems are decidable and
tractable in polynomial time. We also show how to specify automatic priority as-
signment strategies in the Or-BAC model.
4 Conﬂict management in the Or-BAC model
4.1 Basic Principles of Or-BAC
In Or-BAC, the expression of an access control policy is further structured than in
the Rule-BAC model. This will provide means to restate the problems of redun-
dant rules and potential conﬂicts in a decidable and tractable way. More precisely,
Rule-BAC policies consist of rules in which a conjunction of conditions leads to
a permission or prohibition. After analyzing the structure of the condition of a
Rule-BAC policy rule, we suggest structuring this condition as follows:
• condition ↔
cond subject(s) ∧ cond action(a) ∧ cond object(o)∧ constraint(s, a, o)
where cond subject(s), cond action(a) and cond object(o) are respectively the con-
ditions the subject s, the action a and the object o must separately satisfy so that
the corresponding rule applies. constraint(s, a, o) is an additional condition that
joins subject s, action a and object o. Satisfying the constraint is necessary to
activate the rule.
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For instance, let us consider the rule ”a physician is permitted to consult his
or her patient’s medical record”. In this case, cond subject(s), cond action(a) and
cond object(o) respectively correspond to the conditions that s is a physician, a is
an action of consulting and o is a medical record. constraint(s, a, o) is a condition
that joins subject s and object o - in this example, action a is absent from the
constraint - namely o must be a record of s’s patient. The main idea is to deﬁne a
language that enables to structure the set of conditions on which an authorization
is granted. This is one of the main purpose of the Or-BAC model.
The central entity in Or-BAC is the entity Organization. Intuitively, an orga-
nization can be seen as any entity that is responsible for managing a given access
control policy. Hence, hospitals or companies are organizations. A more concrete se-
curity component such as a ﬁrewall may be also viewed as an organization managing
a network access control policy.
In Or-BAC, instead of deﬁning security rules that directly apply to subject,
action and object as in Rule-BAC, the access control policy is deﬁned at the “or-
ganizational” level. For this purpose, subject, action and object are respectively
abstracted into role, activity and view. A view corresponds to a set of objects to
which the same security rules apply. An activity is similarly deﬁned but for regroup-
ing actions. Finally, permissions and prohibitions only apply in speciﬁc contexts.
Examples of context may be Night, Working-Hours or Emergency.
Using these concepts of Or-BAC, cond subject(s), cond object(o) and
cond action(α) respectively correspond to conditions specifying that, in a given
organization, a subject is empowered in a role, an object is used in a view and
an action implements a given activity. Finally, constraint(s, a, o) is modelled as a
condition that speciﬁes that a subject performs an action on an object in a given
context. For instance, the rule “in hospital H, a physician is permitted to con-
sult his or her patient’s medical record” may be represented by a rule having the
following form:
• condition → Permission(s, a, o)
where, condition is the following formula:
Empower(H, s, physician) ∧ Use(H, o,medical record) ∧
Consider(H,a, consult) ∧Hold(H, s, a, o, attending physician)
However, this is not exactly the way an access control policy is speciﬁed in the
Or-BAC model. Actually, in Or-BAC, the access control policy does not directly
apply to subject, action and object. Instead, the access control policy is speciﬁed us-
ing the organizational access control predicates O-Permission and O-Prohibition.
For instance, the fact
O-Permission(H, physician, consult,medical record,Attending physician)
speciﬁes that ”hospital H grants to role physician the permission to consult
medical record in context attending physician”.
Permission (resp. Prohibition) that applies to subject, action and object are
then logically derived from organizational permissions (resp. prohibitions). For
instance, John will obtain the permission to read a given object o if H empowers
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John in role physician, read is an action that implements activity consult, o is an
object used in view medical record and John performs the action read on object o
in the context Attending physician.
Finally, we consider hierarchies of roles, but also of views, activities and con-
texts [10]. We associate these hierarchies with both inheritance of O-Permission
and O-Prohibition. For instance, we can consider a role suspended physician
and specify that suspended physician is a sub-role of physician. Thus, the role
suspended physician will inherit from the role physician the permission to consult
medical record in context attending physician. This may lead to a conﬂict if a
suspended physician is explicitly prohibited to consult medical records. Thus, we
now present how to manage conﬂicts in the Or-BAC model.
4.2 Principles of conﬂict management in Or-BAC
As in Prioritized Rule-BAC, we suggest managing conﬂicts in Or-BAC using pri-
orities. We thus obtain the Prioritized Or-BAC model (see section 4.3 below for a
formal presentation of this model). In Prioritized Or-BAC, priorities are assigned
to O-Permission and O-Prohibition.
Managing actual conﬂicts in Prioritized Or-BAC is quite similar to Prioritized
Rule-BAC and may be checked in polynomial time. However, compared with Rule-
BAC, there is a major diﬀerence in the way we suggest managing redundant rules
and potential conﬂicts in Prioritized Or-BAC.
Let us ﬁrst explain our approach for potential conﬂict management. Since a
subject can potentially be empowered in two diﬀerent roles, an object can be used
in two diﬀerent views, an action can implement two diﬀerent activities and two
diﬀerent contexts can be satisﬁed simultaneously (for instance take contexts Night
and Emergency), every pair of O-Permission and O-Prohibition may be potentially
conﬂicting. Thus, our approach to eliminate such potential conﬂict consists in
specifying separation constraints. For instance, if a separation constraint exists
between roles r1 and r2, then a subject cannot be empowered into both roles r1 and
r2. As a consequence, if a given O-Permission is assigned to role r1 and a given
O-Prohibition is assigned to role r2, then these O-Permission and O-Prohibition
cannot generate a conﬂict. Similarly, we can specify separation constraints between
views, activities and contexts.
If we compare to the Prioritized Rule-BAC model, using separation constraints
provide a way to detect unrelated access control rules. However, whereas recognizing
unrelated rules is generally undecidable, checking separation constraints is tractable
and computable in polynomial time. As a consequence, we shall show that checking
potential conﬂict in Prioritized Or-BAC is also tractable in polynomial time.
Let us now turn to redundant rule management. As in Prioritized Rule-BAC, the
approach is based on exception detection. However our approach in Or-BAC is based
on the inheritance hierarchy between roles, activities, views and contexts. More pre-
cisely, a given O-Authorization (that is an O-Permission or O-Prohibition) A1 is
an exception to another O-Authorization A2, if A2 is “higher” in the hierarchy than
A1. We shall show that using this approach to recognize exceptions is tractable in
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polynomial time. Thus, redundant rule management is also tractable in polynomial
time in Prioritized Or-BAC.
Let us now present our formalization of the prioritized Or-BAC model.
4.3 The prioritized Or-BAC model
4.3.1 Modelling the organization components
The Prioritized Or-BAC model is built on top of the Prioritized Rule-BAC model
deﬁned in section 3. Thus, we consider Π a ﬁnite set of priorities. Π is associated
with a partial order relation ≺.
To model the organization components of Prioritized Or-BAC, we then introduce
the following domain predicates:
• Empower(org, s, r): org empowers subject s in role r. Example:
Empower(H,John, physician) means that “Hospital H empowers John in role
physician.”
• Use(org, o, v): org uses object o in view v. Example:
Use(H,Doc 31,medical record) means that “Hospital H uses object Doc 31
into view medical record.”
• Consider(org, α, a): org considers that action α implements the activity a. Ex-
ample: Consider(H, acroread, consult) means that “Hospital H considers that
action acroread implements the activity consult.”
• Hold(org, s, α, o, c): within organization org, context c holds between subject s,
action α and object o. Example: Hold(H, s, α, o, attending physician) means
that “within hospital H context attending physician holds between subject s,
action a and object o.”
• sub role(org, r1, r2): in organization org, role r1 is a sub-role of r2.
We also use predicates sub view(org, r1, r2), sub activity(org, r1, r2),
sub context(org, r1, r2) to respectively specify hierarchies of views, activi-
ties and contexts. We assume that these hierarchies correspond to partial order
relations.
• seperated role(org, r1, r2): in organization org, role r1 is separated from role r2,
i.e. a given subject cannot be empowered in both roles r1 and r2 (see associated
constraints below). We assume that separation predicates correspond to anti-
reﬂexive and symmetric relations.
Similar predicates seperated view(org, r1, r2), separated activity(org, r1, r2)
and separated context(org, r1, r2) are introduced to respectively specify sepa-
rations of views, activities and contexts.
All other predicates used in Prioritized Rule-BAC are also available in Prioritized
Or-BAC. Regarding deﬁnition 2, we assume that RDOM includes a set of context
deﬁnition rules. For instance:
• record patient(o, p) ∧ patient physician(p, s) ∧ action(a)
→ Hold(H, s, a, o,Attending physician)
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This rule deﬁnes the context “Attending physician” in hospital H as follows: a
subject s performs the action a on object o in the context “Attending physician”
if o is a record corresponding to a patient of subject s.
• record patient(o, p) ∧ urgent case(p) ∧ subject(s) ∧ action(a)
→ Hold(H, s, a, o,Emergency)
This rule deﬁnes the context “Emergency” in H.
More detailed deﬁnition and use of contexts in Or-BAC can be found in [12].
Regarding deﬁnition 3, we assume that Cte includes the following separation
constraints:
• separated role(org, r1, r2) ∧ Empower(org, s, r1) ∧Empower(org, s, r2)
→ error()
Similar constraints are deﬁned for predicates separated view and
separated activity by replacing predicates Empower by predicates Use
(resp. Consider).
• separated context(org, c1, c2) ∧Hold(org, s, a, o, c1) ∧Hold(org, s, a, o, c2)
→ error()
4.3.2 Policy deﬁnition
To deﬁne the access control policy, we introduce the following organizational access
control predicates:
• O-Permission(org, r, a, v, c, p): means that in organization org, role r is granted
permission to perform activity a on view v within context c. Moreover, this
organizational permission is assigned priority p.
• O-Prohibition(org, r, a, v, c, p): similar to predicate O-Permission but for orga-
nizational prohibition.
• O-Authorization(org, r, a, v, c, p): corresponds to an O-Permission or O-
Prohibition.
• DO-Permission(orgr, a, v, c, p): similar to predicate O-Permission but this is a
derived organizational permission through hierarchies of inheritance.
• DO-Prohibition(orgr, a, v, c, p): similar to predicate O-Prohibition but this is a
derived organizational prohibition.
In Prioritized Or-BAC, a prioritized access control policy is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 18: A prioritized access control policy PACP includes the following
set of facts and rules:
• Facts having the form O-Permission(org, s, a, r, c, p) or O-
Prohibition(org, s, a, r, c, p). For instance the fact:
O-Permission(H, physician, consult,med record,Attending physician, p1)
speciﬁes that, in organization H, the role physician is permitted to consult the
view med record in context Attending physician. This permission is assigned
priority p1.
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The following rule speciﬁes inherited permissions through the role hierarchy:
• DO-Permission(org, r2, a, v, c, p) ∧ sub role(org, r1, r2)
→ DO-Permission(org, r1, a, v, c, p)
A similar rule applies to inheritance of prohibitions and predicate DO-
Prohibition is used for this purpose. The hierarchy on activities, views and con-
texts, are similarly associated with the inheritance mechanism that is modelled in
the previous rules.
The following rules say that an organizational permission is also a derived per-
mission and a (positive) authorization:
• O-Permission(org, r, a, v, c, p) → DO-Permission(org, r, a, v, c, p)
• O-Permission(org, r, a, v, c, p) → O-Authorization(org, r, a, v, c, p)
There are similar rules to specify that an organizational prohibition is also a
derived prohibition and a (negative) authorization
There is the following general rule to derive instances of Prima Facie Permission
from Derived Organizational DO-Permission:
• DO-Permission(org, r, a, v, c, p)∧
Empower(org, s, r) ∧ Use(org, o, v) ∧ Consider(org, α, a) ∧Hold(org, s, a, o, c)
→ Permission(s, α, o, p) (GR1)
There is another general rule called (GR2) to derive instances of Prima Facie
Prohibition from Derived Organizational DO-Prohibition.
Deﬁnition of the global conﬂict resolution strategy GCRS is the same as the one
of deﬁnition 12 used in Prioritized Rule-BAC.
4.4 Redundant rules management
As in the Prioritized Rule-BAC model, redundant rules management is based on
the notion of exception to a general authorization. For this purpose, let Ai = O-
Authorization(org, ri, ai, vi, ci, pi) and Aj = O-Authorization(org, rj , aj , vj , cj , pj)
be two (positive or negative) authorizations.
Deﬁnition 19: Authorization Ai is a strict exception to authorization Aj if the
following condition holds:
sub-role(org, ri, rj) ∧ sub-activity(org, ai, aj) ∧
sub-view(org, vi, vj) ∧ sub-context(org, ci, cj) ∧
¬(ri = rj ∧ ai = aj ∧ vi = vj ∧ ci = cj)
The main diﬀerence with Prioritized Rule-BAC is that we can now prove the
following theorem:
Theorem 7: Checking that authorization Ai is an exception to authorization Aj
is tractable in polynomial time.
Proof: Trivial. Checking that authorization Ai is an exception to authorization Aj
corresponds to checking conditions in a stratiﬁed Datalog program, so it is tractable
in polynomial time. 
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Thus, checking the non-redundancy condition deﬁned in section 3.4 is also
tractable in polynomial time.
4.5 Potential conﬂict detection
Deﬁnition 20 (Potential conﬂict condition): A potential conﬂict exists if the
following condition is satisﬁed:
DO-Permission(org, ri, ai, vi, ci, pi) ∧DO-Prohibition(org, rj , aj , vj , cj , pj) ∧
¬(separated-role(org, ri, rj)) ∧ ¬(separated-activity(org, ai, aj)) ∧
¬(separated-view(org, vi, vj)) ∧ ¬(separated-context(org, ci, cj)) ∧
¬Solved-Conﬂict(org, ri, ai, vi, ci, pi, rj , aj , vj , cj , pj)
where Solved-Conflict predicate is deﬁned by the following rule:
DO-Permission(org, ri, ai, vi, ci, pi) ∧DO-Prohibition(org, rj , aj , vj , cj , pj) ∧
((DO-Prohibition(org, r, a, v, c, p) ∧ (pi ≺ p))
∨(DO-Permission(org, r, a, v, c, p) ∧ (pj ≺ p))) ∧
(r = ri ∨ r = rj) ∧ (a = ai ∨ a = aj) ∧ (v = vi) ∨ v = vj) ∧ (c = ci ∨ c = cj)
→ Solved-Conﬂict(org, ri, ai, vi, ci, pi, rj , aj , vj , cj , pj)
This is a quite complex condition, however using this condition of potential
conﬂict, we can prove theorem 5 stated in section 3.5.
Proof: Let us assume that there is an actual conﬂict. It follows from deﬁnition 12
that:
Permission(s, a, o, pi) ∧ ¬Higher-Prohibition(s, a, o, pi) ∧
Prohibition(s, a, o, pj) ∧ ¬Higher-Permission(s, a, o, pj) (1)
Since in Or-BAC, the only way to derive an actual permission and an actual
prohibition is by respectively applying GR1 and GR2, we can conclude that:
DO-Permission(org, ri, ai, vi, ci, pi) ∧DO-Prohibition(org, rj , aj , vj , cj , pj)
and that we have also:
Empower(org, s, ri) ∧ Empower(org, s, rj)
and thus we can conclude that ¬separated-role(org, ri, rj) else error could be de-
rived (which is in contradiction with the assumption that no constraint is violated).
We can similarly derive other separation conditions on activity, view and context
that appear in deﬁnition 20.
Finally, if we assume that:
Solved-Conflict(org, ri, ai, vi, ci, pi, rj , aj , vj , cj , pj)
then we can derive that there is some priority level p such that:
(Prohibition(s, a, o, p) ∧Higher-Prohibition(s, a, o, p1)) ∨
(Permission(s, a, o, p) ∧Higher-Permission(s, a, o, p2))
but this is in contradiction that there is an actual conﬂict. 
By the way, we can and also prove the following theorem:
Theorem 8: Checking the above condition of potential conﬂict is decidable in
polynomial time.
Proof: Trivial. Proof is similar to theorem 7. 
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This last condition is very useful because, using the contraposition of theorem 5,
we can derive that if there is no potential conﬂict according to this condition, then
we can guarantee that we can never derive any actual conﬂict. In particular, this
condition guarantees that we can insert new subjects, objects or actions without
creating actual conﬂicts.
4.6 Example
We use the same example of access control policy as the one presented in section
3.6, and we show how to model it in Prioritized Or-BAC. Here, we assume that Π
is {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}. In Prioritized Or-BAC, access control rules are expressed as
follows (we assume that they apply to a given hospital H):
• O-Prohibition(H,nurse, consult,medical record,Default, p1)
(rule R1 associated with priority p1. Default is a context that is always true for
every subject, action and object).
• O-Permission(H,nurse, consult,medical record,Emergency, p2)
(rule R2 associated with priority p2)
• O-Permission(H, physician, consult,medical record,Attending physician, p3)
(rule R3 associated with priority p3)
• O-Prohibition(H, suspended physician, consult,medical record,Default, p4)
(rule R4 associated with priority p4)
• O-Prohibition(H, suspended nurse, consult,medical record,Default, p5)
(rule R5 associated with priority p5)
We also consider the following inheritance hierarchies and separation constraints:
• sub role(H, suspended physician, physician) ∧
sub role(H, suspended nurse, nurse)
• sub context(H,Attending physician,Default) ∧
sub context(H,Emergency,Default)
• separated role(H,nurse, physician) ∧
separated role(H, suspended nurse, physician)∧
separated role(H,nurse, suspended physician)∧
separated role(H, suspended nurse, suspended physician)
Now, we can check that rule R1 has two exceptions, namely R2 and R5. Thus,
using the no redundancy condition, we can derive that p1 ≺ p2 and p1 ≺ p5. There
is no other exception in our example (in particular, one can check that R4 is not
an exception to R3).
Then, if we apply the separation constraints and the potential conﬂict condition,
we can check that there are two potential conﬂicts: the ﬁrst one between rules R2
and R5 and the second between R3 and R4. To solve this conﬂict, we have to
state priorities between p2 and p5 and between p3 and p4, for instance p2 ≺ p5
and p3 ≺ p4. Thus, in this case, we obtain p1 ≺ p2 ≺ p5 and p3 ≺ p4. Now, the
access control policy is free of potential conﬂict, and one can guarantee that it is
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not possible to derive actual conﬂict when applying this policy. Notice that it was
not necessary to totally order the set of priorities; a partial order is suﬃcient and
is easier to manage.
Finally, as suggested in section 3.7, one can easily specify automatic assignment
strategies in Prioritized Or-BAC. For instance, we could say that security rules
that apply to the emergency context have higher priority than other rules. This
assignment strategy can be expressed as follows:
O-Autorization(org, ri, ai, vi, emergency, pi) ∧
O-Autorization(org, rj , aj , vj , c, pj) ∧ ¬(c = emergency)
→ (pj ≺ pi)
Applying this rule, we can derive that p2 has higher priority than all other
priorities. This can be used to automatically solve the potential conﬂict between
R2 and R5. Due to space limitation, we do not further develop how to specify
automatic assignment strategies.
5 Comparison with related works
We choose to deal in this paper with models termed as Rule-BAC models. We
choose to compare them with a more structured and richer models like Or-BAC as
we argue that Rule-BAC model needs to be enhanced to circumvent many problems
that are consequences of its lack of structure. Or-BAC model, as we show in this
paper, is free from redundant rules and potential conﬂicts detection undecidability
which is not the case of Rule-BAC model. The resolution of conﬂicts is done at
the “organizational” level so that we give assurance that no actual conﬂict occurs
between triples 〈subject, action, object〉.
In this section, we state the results of a more global look at other works in this
domain. In the same way, recent models consider prohibitions and are of course
faced to conﬂicts. This is the case of the model suggested in [5]. In this paper,
Bertino, Jajodia and Samarati suggest an authorization mechanism that enables
multiple access control policies to be supported. The mechanism enforces a general
authorization model that manages both positive and negative authorizations. It
also distinguishes between weak and strong authorizations. A strong authorization
overrides a weak authorization whereas a strong authorization cannot be overridden.
In this model, only conﬂicts between weak authorizations are manageable and, in
this case, the authors propose an approach to resolve conﬂicts.
Another approach is presented in [15]. In this model, the strategy to manage
conﬂicts is “hard-coded” in the sense that there is no clear separation between
the strategy for conﬂict management and the remainder of the policy speciﬁcation.
Moreover, the authors only consider four possible conﬂict management strategies:
No conﬂict (in this case, a conﬂict is viewed as a constraint violation), prohibitions
take precedence, permissions take precedence and nothing takes precedence (means
that there is actually no conﬂict resolution). Thus, from the point of view of conﬂict
management, this approach is less ﬂexible than Prioritized Or-BAC.
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A more recent approach is suggested in [3]. This model speciﬁes an access control
policy as a set of logical rules expressed in a language that is quite similar to [16].
It suggests managing conﬂicts using the concept of conﬂict resolution policy (crp).
This idea is quite similar to our concept of conﬂict resolution strategy. However,
deﬁnition of a crp is fully separated from the remainder of the policy speciﬁcation
and is only used to provide semantics to the suggested model. In our approach, a
CRS is used to assign priority levels to permissions and prohibitions. This is used to
model the concept of prioritized policy as a single logical theory that includes both
the policy speciﬁcation and the CRS. Thus, we obtain a more integrated model.
In [7], a security policy is modelled using modal logic, permissions, prohibitions
and obligations being represented using deontic modalities. This provides a richer
model in which it is possible to specify, for instance, disjunctive obligations or
conjunctive prohibitions. However, this paper only suggests managing conﬂicts
using priority between roles. In [9], the approach is reﬁned and the concept of
strategy to manage conﬂicts is introduced. However, this strategy is used to deﬁne
priority between roles and its speciﬁcation is separated from the remainder of the
policy speciﬁcation. Thus, our approach is more integrated and provides means
to specify more ﬂexible strategies. Moreover, the complexity of reasoning with the
strategies is not addressed in [7].
Finally, [2] suggests an approach based on possibilistic logic to handle conﬂicts
in prioritized security policies. The priority is implicitly derived from the format
of rules. This is used to eﬀectively construct a stratiﬁed theory in which conﬂicts
are solved. However, this strategy is not always eﬀective to solve every conﬂict and
must be reﬁned to handle unsolved conﬂict situations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show the advantage of managing conﬂict in an access control policy
modelled in Or-BAC. Since a policy in Or-BAC is deﬁned at an organizational level
(i.e. independently of actual implementation of subjects, objects and actions in the
system), we suggest managing conﬂicts at the organizational level. Our approach is
based on deﬁning conﬂict resolution strategy (CRS) that is used to assign priority
levels to organizational permissions or prohibitions. Two diﬀerent situations may
arise when using a CRS: (1) Redundant rules may exist and (2) potential conﬂict
may arise.
We show that these two problems are tractable in polynomial time in the Or-
BAC model unlike models using an equivalent logical approach to specify access
control rules but using a less structured framework, say Rule-BAC models. More-
over, a tool, called MotOrBAC has been designed and implemented to specify an
Or-BAC policy and manage conﬂicts (see http://www.orbac.org for more informa-
tion).
There are several possible extensions to this work. First Or-BAC also includes
the possibility to specify obligations. However, Since conﬂicts can also occur be-
tween obligation and prohibition [6,8] , managing such conﬂicts represent further
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work that remains to be done.
In this paper, we only investigate the problem of conﬂicts within a single orga-
nization. We are also applying our approach to control interoperability of organi-
zations managing diﬀerent security policies. Our proposal is well suited to detect
and manage conﬂicts that occurs when these organizations want to interoperate.
Finally, in [11], AdOr-BAC, an administration model for Or-BAC is deﬁned and
implemented. It would be interested to extend our approach to manage conﬂicts
between administration rules. In particular, AdOr-BAC includes the possibility
to specify delegation rules that may generate conﬂicts with other security rules.
Managing these conﬂicts represents further work that remains to be done.
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